

WANDERING PHILOSOPHERS IN CLASSICAL GREECE*

THE wandering philosopher is best known to us as a Romantic ideal that projects one's longing for physical and mental withdrawal.¹ Rousseau's 'promeneur solitaire' does not cover great distances to bring a message to the world. His wanderings, most often in the immediate surroundings, rather convey spiritual alienation. But the 'promeneur solitaire' is not the only kind of wandering philosopher known in Western culture. Itinerant philosophers existed already in antiquity. During the Roman empire, many sages wandered all over the Mediterranean world. They went about for the sake of intellectual and spiritual enrichment, but essentially to spread their teaching and to intervene in local quarrels as religious consultants. Wandering connoted their ambiguous status in society—both in and out—and thereby enhanced their charisma and endowed them with an aura of superior power.²

The growing presence of wandering philosophers in the Roman empire is related to socio-political and cultural factors. On the one hand, the unification of the Mediterranean after Alexander, and especially under the rule of Rome, made travelling easier and safer.³ The burgeoning of itinerant sages bears witness to the coherence of the Roman empire.⁴ On the other hand, one's native city became less important in the perception of one's role and identity. While they usually did relate to their native communities, most sages propounded cosmopolitanism and cultivated remoteness.⁵ But what about earlier periods, when travelling was much less common or desirable and when one's native city did represent a significant locus of identity? Why would a philosopher embrace the behaviour of the wanderer in archaic and classical Greece? What message, if any, would he want to convey?

By 'wandering' we primarily mean an unstructured and unfocused movement. Greek has two main verbs that express this notion: ἀλασθαί and πλανᾶσθαι. Both verbs (and their cognates) also describe the condition of the outcast, while πλανᾶσθαι can mean travelling, not along a road, from A to B, but along many roads, without setting a final destination. These semantic overlaps alone suggest the complexity of connotations that the Greeks attached to wandering.

Since Homer, the wanderer was perceived as an uncanny figure, whose identity it was difficult to 'locate'. Wanderers are unknowable, unclassifiable. They could be anything because they appear to be from everywhere and nowhere. A wanderer may look like a beggar, but he could be a god. In the *Odyssey*, one of the 'proud youths' makes precisely this point in rebuking Antinous, who has abused the 'wandering beggar' Odysseus: 'you did not well to strike the unhappy wanderer (δύστηνον ἀλήτην), ruined man. What if perchance he is a god come from the sky? And the gods, like strangers from a foreign land, assuming all sorts of shapes turn in and out from city to city, looking at the violence and the justice of men' (*Od.* 17.483–7). The wanderer lives at the margins of humanity, both below and above: a beggar, he must creep around asking for food, and cannot afford to keep his dignity (*Od.* 17.578); a god, he judges men from his superior vantage point. Odysseus, whom the 'proud youth' has before his eyes, indeed

* I wish to thank Jim McKeown, Terry Penner, Barry Powell, and André Wink, who generously read earlier versions of this paper, as well as Richard Hunter and the two anonymous readers for the *Journal of Hellenic Studies* for their compelling and helpful criticism.

¹ The most famous avatar of a wandering philosopher is Jean-Jacques Rousseau. In addition to the *Rêveries d'un promeneur solitaire*, cf. *Confessions* 3.114, 4.153, 4.162.

² Cf. Anderson (1994) *passim*, esp. 46, 81, 167–77, 218–21.

³ Cf. Casson (1994).

⁴ Cf. Bowersock (1969) 1, 21 (about the Sophists). Although the Sophists were more integrated into imperial society than most itinerant philosophers, the external conditions that made travelling possible were the same for all of them.

⁵ Cf. Anderson (1994) 43–4. The Sophists remained more attached to their native cities if the latter were important cultural centres. Cf. Bowersock (1968) 18.

epitomizes archaic Greek perceptions about the wanderer. Odysseus is surrounded with the mystery that surrounds wanderers. In reporting his sudden epiphany among the Phaeacians, Alcinous identifies him only as a wanderer: 'This stranger—who he is I do not know—wandering has come to my house, either from men of the east or of the west' (*Od.* 8.28–9). Like any wanderer's, Odysseus' paths are difficult to retrace, and along with his paths, his origin and very identity.

Since they baffle their observers, wanderers are regarded as deceivers. Deceivers in their looks, like the gods who go from city to city without making themselves recognized; deceivers in their words, like the many who came to Ithaca in their wanderings and told Penelope false tales about Odysseus in order to kindle her hope and be rewarded. Eumaeus mistrusts the wanderer who sits before him and who claims that he has seen Odysseus in his wanderings: 'Old man, no one who came in his wanderings and brought news of him persuaded his wife and his son; on the contrary, wanderers, because they need sustenance, lie at random and have no desire to tell the truth. Whoever in his wanderings comes to the people of Ithaca goes to my mistress and speaks guileful words' (*Od.* 14.122–7). Eumaeus no longer believes anyone who announces Odysseus' imminent return 'since the time when an Aetolian deceived me with his story, one who had killed a man and came to my house after wandering far and wide over the earth, and I gave him kindly welcome' (*Od.* 14.379–81).

Eumaeus is indeed deceived by Odysseus: he believes the fictional parts of the story, but not the true part (cf. *Od.* 14.360–4); nor does he understand that Odysseus' lies have a core of truth beneath the surface.⁶ Therefore, Odysseus is the prototype of the wanderer because he is the prototype of the deceiver. His tales seem truthful where they lie and they lie where they seem truthful. Odysseus' truth, which accommodates lying, also accommodates wandering.⁷ His 'wandering tales' can be both true and false at the same time, just as the wanderer who tells them is and is not what he appears to be.

Thus, wandering spells out Odysseus' deviousness and elusive identity. But Odysseus incarnates the Greek wanderer also *qua* man of suffering. The association between wandering and suffering is pervasive in archaic and classical Greek culture. Tlepolemos, a son of Heracles, took to the sea after killing his paternal uncle and wandered, suffering evil (*Hom. Il.* 2.667: ἀλώμενος, ἄλγεα πάσχω). The first wanderer that we meet in Greek literature is an exiled murderer. Along with the murderer, the second specimen of a wanderer in the *Iliad* is the forsaken hero, Bellerophon: 'But when he too incurred the hatred of all the gods, he wandered alone in the Wandering Plain, eating his heart, avoiding the path of men.'⁸ Wandering defines the condition of the man to whom Zeus has given only evil: 'bad hunger chases him on the divine earth, and he wanders, dishonoured by gods and men' (*Il.* 24.532–3). Along similar lines, Odysseus tells Eumaeus: 'Nothing is worse than wandering for mortals; but because of their cursed bellies men endure evil woes, when wandering and suffering and pain come on them.'⁹ The man who so often has been driven to wander knows that wandering, like pain, 'comes'

⁶ Cf. Pratt (1993) 89–93.

⁷ Cf. Segal (1994) 179–83, who plays on the pun ἀληθής/ἀλήτης in *Od.* 14.118–27.

⁸ ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ καὶ κείνος ἀπήχθετο πᾶσι θεοῖσιν, / ἦτοι ὁ κάπ πεδίον τὸ Ἀλήϊον οἶος ἀλάτο, / ὄν θυμὸν κατέδων, πάτον ἀνθρώπων ἀλείων. (*Il.* 6.200–2). Cf. Padel (1995) 102. The image of a 'Wandering Plain', a fictional place that takes its name from its function, and the repeated alliteration Ἀλήϊον/ἀλάτο/ἀλείων (etymologically related to ἀλόμαι), characterize Bellerophon as the embodiment of the wanderer.

⁹ πλαγκτοσύνης δ' οὐκ ἔστι κακώτερον ἄλλο βροτοῖσιν / ἀλλ' ἔνεκ' οὐλομένης γαστρὸς κακὰ κῆδε' ἔχουσιν / ἀνέρες, ὄν τιν' ἴκεται ἄλη καὶ πῆμα καὶ ἄλγος (*Od.* 15.343–5). Cf. Padel (1995) 107. Wandering associated with suffering: cf. also *Od.* 13.418, 14.362, 15.176, 15.401, 16.205, 19.170. Tragic poets similarly link wandering, evil, and divine wrath. Words related to wandering become metaphors for suffering. As Wilamowitz points out ((1969) 3.1197), πολύπλαγκτος in tragedy means both 'much wandering' and 'much suffering'.

(ἵκεται) upon man.¹⁰ Odysseus' interpretation of wandering as the consequence of a brutal aggression matches a general pattern in Greek thought: to conceive wandering as the result of an external force that drives body and mind away from their normal course. Endlessly goaded by a god-sent frenzy, the mad person wanders.¹¹

Odysseus, however, learns from his toilsome wanderings. The man who was much turned, much driven and much pained, also saw the cities and learned the minds of many men.¹² The outcome of Odysseus' undesired wanderings is knowledge.¹³ Thus, Odysseus is a wanderer also *qua* man of learning. This positive connotation of wandering is much less prominent in archaic and classical Greek culture, where most people travelled not for pleasure but for necessity or under compulsion, and even those who travelled for pleasure did not enjoy travelling as such but were only eager to reach their final destination.¹⁴ Nonetheless, the first philosophers who took to wandering did so under no other compulsion than their intellectual curiosity,¹⁵ whereby they contributed to the spreading of this positive meaning of wandering as a source of knowledge. By embracing wandering, they wished to cast themselves as world-travellers.¹⁶

If we believe Herodotus, Solon was the first philosopher credited with wandering. When he arrived at the court of Croesus, the Lydian king welcomed him with these words: 'Athenian guest, much rumour has come to us about you, both your knowledge and your wandering, that out of love for knowledge (φιλοσοφείων) you went about to visit many places.'¹⁷

'Wandering' and 'philosophy' are coupled in this laudatory phrase that Croesus addresses to the Athenian sage. As a world-traveller, Solon inaugurates a tradition which eventually spreads so widely that Diogenes Laertius regards the philosopher who loathes travelling as an exception (2.22). Solon had left Athens both to prevent his set of laws from being changed and θεωρίης εἵνεκεν, for the sake of observation, the only reason he alleged publicly (1.29–30). Love of knowledge is the motive that drove several other Presocratics to travel extensively. Although these sages were also called upon to share their wisdom, as Solon's example alone shows, they primarily went about to learn for themselves rather than to teach others. Their wanderings are a 'Bildungsreise'.¹⁸ This seems to be true also in the case of the Scythian sage Anacharsis in Herodotus' account. Anacharsis, whose mother was Greek, had developed a strong interest in the Greek way of life. He thus went to Greece in order to learn more about Greek customs. Then, 'having observed many places and acquired much knowledge', he went back to Scythia

¹⁰ Line 345, however, does not appear in all the manuscripts.

¹¹ In tragedy, Orestes and Io are the two great avatars of mad wanderers; cf. Padel (1995) 102–7. Io: Aesch. *Pr.* 565, 576, 585, 622, 784; *Supp.* 16–17, 307–9, 524–49. Orestes: Aesch. *Choeph.* 1042; *Eum.* 238–40; Eur. *Or.* 55–6. Mental wandering as a sign of madness: Eur. *Hipp.* 141–4 with the commentary of Barrett (1964) and Padel (1995) 104. These images of mad wanderers can be compared with Proitus' daughters, driven mad by Dionysus (or Hera) and roaming in the wilderness. One version of this myth (Apollod. 2.2.2) records that the raving maidens inspired all the other women to forsake their homes, kill their children and run off into solitude; cf. Burkert (1983) 171. Another famous mad wanderer is Dionysus himself: cf. Apollod. 3.5.1; Nonn. *D.* 32.125–9.

¹² *Od.* 1.1–4.

¹³ Odysseus' learning through enforced wandering foreshadows Aeschylus' famous formula τῶι πάθει μάθος (*Ag.* 177).

¹⁴ Cf. Casson (1994) *passim*; Stanford (1968) 86. A passage from Plato's *Gorgias* (467d) is based precisely on the assumption that the Greeks of that time did not conceive of travelling for its own sake.

¹⁵ In the case of Solon, however, there may also have been a political reason; see *infra*.

¹⁶ The term used to describe this kind of philosophical wanderings, as we shall see, is *planê*, which can be synonymous with travelling.

¹⁷ Ξεῖνε Ἀθηναῖε, παρ' ἡμέας γὰρ περὶ σέο λόγος ἀπίκται πολλὸς καὶ σοφίης τῆς σῆς καὶ πλάνης, ὡς φιλοσοφείων γῆν πολλὴν θεωρίης εἵνεκεν ἐπελήλυθας (1.30). On this passage, cf. Payen (1997) 338–9. On Solon's wanderings, cf. also D.L. 1.113.

¹⁸ The term *paideia* actually appears in a passage of Diodorus Siculus about Greek travellers to Egypt in older times (1.96.1–3). Other Presocratics who travelled extensively are Democritus and Pythagoras (see *infra*; D.L. 9.35–6 and 8.2).

where he was killed for having introduced Greek cults.¹⁹ Herodotus casts Anacharsis as a Scythian Solon: they both go to ‘many places’ for the sake of *theôriê* and *sophia*.²⁰

The Odyssean model of the wanderer who learns from his wanderings seems to underlie Herodotus’ description of Solon and Anacharsis. These sages even ‘improve’ Odysseus’ approach to wandering by embracing wandering voluntarily. Far from being forced to wander, they choose to set off for the sake of observation and discovery. Unlike Odysseus, Solon and Anacharsis are tourists.²¹ Odysseus unwillingly wanders away from his homebound journey, while these sages willingly wander far from home. Odysseus’ intended movement is centripetal, Solon’s and Anacharsis’, centrifugal.

Their choice of wandering to accumulate knowledge is shared by Democritus, another world-traveller who said of himself: ‘I, among my contemporaries, wandered most over the earth, inquiring the farthest things. I saw most skies and lands and heard most learned men...’²² *Historein*, associated with *planê* in Democritus’ self-presentation, has the same meaning as *sophia* or *philosophein*, similarly coupled with *planê*, in Herodotus’ descriptions of Solon and Anacharsis. This semantic equivalence suggests a continuity between these images of wandering sages and the first ‘historians’, who similarly presented themselves as wanderers by choice. Herodotus—who was a tourist as much as his Solon and Anacharsis—indeed cast himself as an Odyssean world-inquirer. His travels, far from having a centre or a predetermined purpose, satisfied the intellectual needs of the hour and accordingly produced a ‘wandering writing’.²³ The model of Odysseus as a wandering storyteller may also underlie Herodotus’ taste for fabulous tales about fabulous lands.²⁴ Before him, Hecataeus had called himself ‘a man who wandered much’, ἀνήρ πολυπλανήης.²⁵ There is hardly any difference between these wandering men of learning in their approach to knowledge: both the ‘historian’ and the ‘philosopher’ aim at understanding the complexity and variety of the world by their all-encompassing travels.

A Presocratic philosopher who travels to expand his knowledge is the opposite of the Romantic wanderer who moves away from men. The wandering philosopher in Solon’s version does not withdraw from his fellow humans: he is not a ‘promeneur solitaire’, no matter how

¹⁹ Hdt. 4.76.4–5: ... ἔπειτε γῆν πολλὴν θεωρήσας καὶ ἀποδεξάμενος κατ’ αὐτὴν σοφίην πολλήν. Cf. Hartog (1980) 82–101; Martin (1996) 142–3; Payen (1997) 57–8. Khazanov (1982) 16–17 and 21 reads this version of Anacharsis’ death as a sign of widespread hostility against Greek culture in sixth-century Scythia.

²⁰ Cf. Hartog (1980) 83–4; Kindstrand (1981) 27–8. The legend of Anacharsis will connect the two: cf. D.L. 1.101–2. I take ἀποδεξάμενος in Herodotus’ passage as coming from ἀποδέχομαι (‘I receive’) rather than from ἀποδείκνυμι (‘I display’). Cf. Kindstrand (1981) 27–8: Kindstrand thinks that the underlying tradition is precisely that of Greek philosophers travelling, and he cites the passage of Diodorus Siculus about Greek travellers to Egypt (1.96.1) in which the verb δέχομαι is used in a similar context. Indeed, in reporting a different version of the story, Herodotus presents Anacharsis explicitly as a student, rather than as a teacher (77): ‘he became a student of Greece’ (τῆς Ἑλλάδος μαθητῆς). It is true that the ‘student’ ends up criticizing the Greeks (except the Spartans); but this does not mean that he becomes a teacher. *Contra*: Ungefehr-Kortus (1996) 36–40. Only in later versions of the legend is Anacharsis presented as the foreign sage who teaches the Greeks. On this famous development, cf. esp. Kindstrand (1981); Martin (1996). On Anacharsis’ wanderings, cf. also D.L. 1.103 (πλανηθεῖς); Ael. *VH* 5.17: Ἀναχάρσις. . . καὶ περαιτέρω προήγαγε τὴν πλάνην; Lucianus, *Anach.* 18: ἐγὼ νομάς καὶ πλάνης ἄνθρωπος. See also *infra*.

²¹ Homeric Odysseus is not a tourist; he only ‘made the best of his enforced wanderings’ (Stanford (1968) 87).

²² DK 68 B 299: ἐγὼ δὲ τῶν κατ’ ἐμαυτὸν ἀνθρώπων γῆν πλείστην ἐπεπλανησάμην ἱστορέων τὰ μήκιστα καὶ ἀέρας τε καὶ γέας πλείστας εἶδον καὶ λογίων ἀνδρῶν πλείστων ἐπήκουσα. . . Cf. Marincola (1997) 2.

²³ On Herodotus as a tourist, cf. Redfield (1985) and Casson (1994) 95–111. On the Odyssean model underlying Herodotus’ self-presentation, cf. Marincola (1997). The Odyssean reference is clear from the beginning of Herodotus’ work (1.5.13–14): ‘... going over large and small cities of men alike’, where ‘going over’ (ἐπεξιῶν) connects Herodotus’ wanderings as a traveller with his wanderings as a writer. He will go over in writing the places he has gone over in his travels. On the relatively improvised character of Herodotus’ travels, cf. Asheri (1991) xvi–xvii. On the historian’s ‘wandering writing’, cf. Payen (1997) 334–8.

²⁴ Marincola (1997) 13–18.

²⁵ *FGrHist* 1 T 12a. Cf. Marincola (1997) 2.

alone he may be during his wanderings.²⁶ Solitude is a highly positive value for several Presocratics, especially for those interested in natural phenomena;²⁷ but when they long for solitude, these philosophers do not wander. They just ‘withdraw’ (*ekpatein*) and choose an isolated residence, whether it be ‘in the mountains’, like Heraclitus the misanthropist, or on the heights of their intellectual concerns, like Anaxagoras, who retired from public affairs to move up ‘to the sky’.²⁸ In every case, the philosopher’s yearning for isolated places does not translate itself into solitary wanderings.

It is true that Empedocles did describe himself as a lonely wanderer:

There is an oracle of Necessity, an old decree of the gods, everlasting, sealed with broad oaths: when one, faulty with murder, has stained his limbs, who also swore a perjury after his fault <following strife?>, one of the demons who have been allotted a very long life, he must wander three times ten thousand seasons far from the blest and in the course of time he must take up all sorts of aspects of mortal things, exchanging one hard way of life for another. For the might of the air chases him to the sea, and the sea spits him up to the surface of the earth, and the earth to the rays of the brilliant sun, and the sun to the whirling of the air. One receives him from another, but all hate him. Now I also belong to them, an exile from the gods and a wanderer, having entrusted myself to raving strife.²⁹

This is the first time that a Greek philosopher refers to himself as a lonely, exiled wanderer. But Empedocles presents this condition as a doom.³⁰ His description of the stained demons, who wander rejected by all the elements, foreshadows Plato’s description of the evil soul, likewise condemned to wander apart: ‘Everyone flees and avoids it; no one wants to become its travel companion or its guide, and it wanders alone in utter distress...’³¹ In both cases, wandering in solitude is the punishment for a fault, and not the conscious behaviour of a withdrawn mind. Empedocles chooses the image of the outcast wanderer to picture the hardship of human life under the necessary domination of Strife. The demon who stained himself with perjury and

²⁶ In classical Greece, however, travellers were hardly alone on the road. Only the very poor and the exile travelled alone: cf. Casson (1994) 76.

²⁷ An example is Thales of Miletus, who allegedly said of himself that he lived ‘in solitude and as a private citizen’ (μονήρη ... καὶ ἰδιαστήν) (D.L. 1.25).

²⁸ Cf. D.L. 9.3 (Heraclitus); 2.7 (Anaxagoras). Cf. also 1.112 (Epimenides). The image of Socrates swinging in the air and speculating about the sun at the beginning of Aristophanes’ *Clouds* (225) caricatures this type of the aloof physiologist.

²⁹ ἔστιν Ἀνάγκης χρῆμα, θεῶν ψήφισμα παλαιόν, / αἶδιον, πλατέεσσι κατεσφρηγισμένον ὄρκοις· ἐδῦτέ τις ἀμπλακίησι φόνωι φίλα γυῖα μίηνηι, / νεϊκεῖ θ’ ὅς κε ἐπίορκον ἀμαρτήσας ἐπομόσσηι / δαίμονες οἶτε μακραίωνος λελάχασι βίοιο, / τρίς μιν μυρίας ὥρας ἀπὸ μακάρων ἀλάλησθαι, / φυόμενους παντοῖα διὰ χρόνου εἶδεα θνητῶν / ἀργαλέας βιότοιο μεταλλάσσοντα κελεύθους. / αἰθέριον μὲν γάρ σφε μένος πόντονδε διώκει, / πόντος δ’ ἐς χθονὸς οὐδας ἀπέπτυσε, γαῖα δ’ ἐς αὐγὰς / ἠελίου φαέθοντος, ὁ δ’ αἰθέρος ἔμβαλε δίναις· / ἄλλος δ’ ἐξ ἄλλου δέχεται, στυγέουσι δὲ πάντες. / τῶν καὶ ἐγὼ νῦν εἶμι, φυγὰς θεόθεν καὶ ἀλήτης, / νεϊκεῖ μαινομένωι πίνουος (DK 115 B). Martin and Primavesi (1999) 112–19 maintain that the traditional attribution of this fragment to the *Katharmoi* is probably wrong. If *fr.* 115 belongs to the *Phusika*, this is one more reason to support the interpretations of Empedocles’ philosophy that see no contradiction between demonology and physical theory. In fact, the Strasbourg papyrus published by Martin and Primavesi (and by them attributed to the *Phusika*) seems to include the demons into the description of the cosmic cycle. According to the editors (91–5), the instances of first person plural that recur in the papyrus refer to the demons. Because they have been incarnated, the demons remember and are able to describe the general traits of the cosmic cycle. To their collective memory Empedocles opposes his own memory as an individual demon, not yet disincarnated (*fr.* 115: *egō*).

³⁰ I wonder whether Empedocles’ baroque description of the wandering demon has not been influenced by the experience of volcanic eruptions. At least Cassius Dio depicts the eruption of Vesuvius in AD 79 in terms that remind me of Empedocles’ fragment: ‘This was what happened. Many big men, surpassing human nature, similar to the giants as painters depict them, appeared at one moment on the mountain, at another in the land around and in the cities, going about (περινοστοῦντες) the earth day and night and also roaming (διαφοιτῶντες) in the air...’ (66.22.2–3). Empedocles, who was from Acragas, may indeed have seen Etna erupt.

³¹ ταύτην μὲν ἅπας φεύγει τε καὶ ὑπεκτρέπεται καὶ οὔτε ξυνέμπορος οὔτε ἡγεμὼν ἐθέλει γίγνεσθαι, αὐτῇ δὲ πλανᾶται ἐν πάσῃ ἐχομένῃ ἀπορίαι... (*Phd.* 108b 7–c 1). Cf. also *Phd.* 81d 7–9.

bloodshed is exiled into a mortal body and condemned to multiple incarnations.³²

This image draws on the pervasive negative connotations of wandering as suffering. As murder was legally punished with wandering in myth and society, so is Empedocles' demon.³³ Equally traditional is Empedocles' interpretation of wandering as the result of a maddening force. It is because he obeyed 'Raving Strife' that the faulty demon roams the earth, away from the gods.³⁴ Empedocles places lonely wandering within the realm of Strife in two other fragments: 'This is the case with the splendid bulk of mortal limbs. At times, through Love, all the limbs that the body has obtained come together to make one, at the culmination of flourishing life; at times, divided again by Strife, they wander, each apart, at the edges of life',³⁵ 'The limbs, each made alone by the dividing force of Strife, were wandering, and they longed for mixing with one another.'³⁶ In all these fragments, wandering alone follows from the separation caused by hatred. Like the hated wanderer of epic, Empedocles' wandering limbs are cast at the margins, 'at the edges of life'.³⁷

To recapitulate: Presocratic philosophers seem to have valued and practised wandering only as a means of expanding their horizon through the observation of diverse people and places. Otherwise, they shared the predominantly negative connotations attached to wandering in con-

³² I take the *daimones* to be the impure souls of all living beings, doomed to wander from one mortal body to another. Cf. Cornford (1960) 567; O'Brien (1969) 325–6; Wright (1995) 270–5. This interpretation, already preferred in antiquity (cf. Plu. *Mor.* 607 c–e), has been rejected by Gallavotti (1975) 272–8, who maintains that Empedocles does not conceive of any noetic principle independent of the body: there is no soul that wanders from body to body, but only material elements that wander from one bodily combination to another. If this is the case, however, who are the *daimones*? Gallavotti thinks that the *daimones* are the blessed (the *makares* of line 6). He understands the relative close *daimones hoite* (line 5) as proleptic and referring to *apo makarōn* (line 6): 'he must wander away from the blest, *daimones* who have been allotted a very long life'. This reading raises two problems: (1) most commentators (including Gallavotti) argue that Empedocles is here inspired by a passage from Hesiod's *Theogony* (793–801), the wording of which he echoes very closely (for instance, Wright points to the similarities between line 800 in Hesiod and line 12 in our fragment). Along with the concepts and the vocabulary, Empedocles reproduces the syntax of the Hesiodic passage. One can compare *Theogony* 793–4: ὅς κεν τὴν ἐπίορκον ἀπολείψας ἐπομόσση / ἀθανάτων, οἳ ἔχουσι κάρη νιφόεντος Ὀλύμπου, with Empedocles 115.4–5: ἐπίορκον ἀμαρτήσας ἐπομόσση / δαίμονες οἴτε μακράϊωνος λελάχασι βίοιο (Empedocles may have preferred the anacoluthic nominative plural δαίμονες to the genitive for prosodic reasons). The parallels between these two passages make it more likely that the antecedent of *daimones hoite* is the preceding sentence rather than the following one (as in Gallavotti's reading). (2) DK 126 B seems to suggest that Empedocles did conceive of a noetic principle other than the body and bound to be born as a body: '... (Necessity?) putting around (the demon?) an unfamiliar garment of flesh'. The body, like the earth, is 'unfamiliar' to the demon. Cf. Wright (1995) 277; Zafropulo (1953) 118. Similarly, in *fr.* 115 the four 'roots' (earth, water, air and fire), all present, are distinguished from the *daimones*. Since Love is the only missing element, the *daimones* could well be fragments of Love incarnated: cf. Martin and Primavesi (1999) 85 and 95 (with reference to Cornford and O'Brien). Even in this case, however, the *daimones* enter the mortal bodies but are not identical with them.

³³ On the legal tradition underlying the punishment of the *daimones* in Empedocles' fragment, cf. Wright (1995) 63–9. The reading φόνωι (line 3) is a conjecture replacing the transmitted φόβωι (cf. Plutarch, *De exilio* 17.607 c–d). Although the identification of the demon's fault with bloodshed raises a problem because the demon, at this stage, is not yet incarnated (Martin and Primavesi (1999) 62), φόβωι hardly makes any sense: why would fear cause a pollution?

³⁴ Cf. also DK 121 B: 'They [the demons] wander (ἠλάσκουσιν) in darkness over the field of Ate.'

³⁵ τοῦτο μὲν ἀν βροτέων μελέων ἀριδείκετον ὄγκον / ἄλλοτε μὲν Φιλότητι συνερχόμεν' εἰς ἔν ἅπαντα / γυῖα, τὰ σῶμα λέλογχε, βίου θαλέθοντος ἐν ἀκμῆι / ἄλλοτε δ' αὐτε κακῆισι διατμηθέντ' Ἐρίδεσσι / πλάζεται ἀνδιχ' ἕκαστα περίρρηγμῖνι βίοιο· (DK 20 B 1–5). περίρρηγμῖνι βίοιο· echoes the Homeric phrase ἐπὶ ῥηγμῖνι θαλάσσης. Martin and Primavesi (1999) 143 have inserted this fragment into the Strasbourg papyrus. In fact, a line from the papyrus seems to contain a similar idea: [κᾶλλο]ς τ(ε) ἄλλ(α) ἵκαλε τόπους πλαγ[χθέντ' ἰδίους τε?] (cf. Martin and Primavesi (1999) 137, a (ii) 16). It is possible that *fr.* 20 describes the destruction of the world ruled by Strife: cf. Martin and Primavesi (1999) 82, 89, 109, 218–29, 266, 280, with reference to O'Brien.

³⁶ μουνομελῆ ἔτι τὰ γυῖα ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ Νείκου διακρίσεως ὄντα ἐπλανᾶτο τῆς πρὸς ἄλλα μίξεως ἐφιέμενα (DK 58 B).

³⁷ In DK 57 B 2 (the limbs were wandering (ἐπλάζοντο) apart from each other), the ruling force could be Love: cf. Martin and Primavesi (1999) 56. Even in this case, however, wandering characterizes the earliest stage in the biological development.

temporary Greece.³⁸ No one among them glamorized wandering as the solitary gesture of a withdrawn mind. Nor did they voluntarily embrace the condition of the wanderer in order to advertise homelessness and non-belonging. Expanding one's horizon through wandering does not mean rejecting one's society, wandering away from it. The philosopher who takes to wandering seeks to make more contacts with societies other than his own. Conversely, the philosopher who withdraws from society does not wander.

Similarly, the aim of the Sophists' wanderings was not to withdraw from society. Most of them were foreigners who left their cities and travelled, often far and wide. As is expected of this group of intellectuals who shifted the focus of philosophy from nature to man, and even more to men in society, going about has the purpose of meeting, rather than fleeing, humans. But unlike Solon or Democritus, the Sophists did not travel in order to acquire knowledge. Hardly any 'theory', any abstract curiosity or ethnographic interest motivated their travels.³⁹ Rather, the Sophists travelled to sell their skill. Like many modern intellectuals and artists, they went where the jobs were: this is why they tended to converge in Athens, where they had better chances of succeeding. Travelling was part of their professional activity.⁴⁰ Despite their foreign origin and extensive travels, however, the Sophists did not pride themselves on being wanderers. One might expect at least the nomadic Gorgias to do so. Gorgias was a true homeless wanderer: he refused to settle down in any city but went all around Greece to deliver his speeches.⁴¹ Moreover, it would perhaps not be out of character for him to take up the persona of the wandering storyteller, able to charm his audience like Odysseus.⁴² Yet, we do not know that he ever said 'I am a wanderer'. This reticence may suggest that even the revolutionary Sophists did not oppose the negative perceptions about the wanderer dominant in their society. Since they could not claim to belong to the one category of wanderers which had won recognition in intellectual circles, that of travelling inquirers, the Sophists preferred not to attach the label of the wanderer to themselves.

By contrast, Plato took care to call the Sophists 'wanderers', but he did so in openly disparaging terms. Since Homer, calling someone a wanderer was tantamount to insulting that person.⁴³ Similarly, Plato undermined the Sophists' worth by attaching to them the label of the wanderer. The Sophist is 'the one who buys up articles of knowledge and, for money, exchanges city for city.'⁴⁴ Going about identifies the Sophist as a merchant; it is the behaviour of the ambitious

³⁸ In describing the condition of the soul, an anonymous author from the Pythagorean school opposes quiet and wandering in a way that foreshadows Platonic images (cf. *Phd.* 79c 7–d 5; 81a 6–8): 'When [sc. the soul] is strong and at rest within itself (καθ' αὐτὴν γενομένη ἡρεμῆι), speeches and deeds become its ties; when it is thrown upon the earth, it wanders (πλάζεσθαι) in the air like the body' (DK 1 B a). In a much-discussed fragment of Parmenides (DK 16 B), probably to be assigned to the way of seeming (Gallop (1984) 87), the 'wandering limbs' (μελέων πολυπλάγκτων) signify either the instability of humans and the constant change in their constitution and mentality (Coxon (1986) 90) or even noetic impotence (Wilamowitz (1969) 3.1196); in another (DK 6 B), ignorant mortals wander (βροτοὶ εἰδότες οὐδὲν / πλάζονται; the verb is an emendation of the transmitted πλάττονται), prey to ἀμηχανίη in their 'wandering mind' (πλαγκτὸν νόον); in a third fragment (DK 8 B 54), wandering means erring. Democritus relates wandering to disorders in the body (B 57, 2; 126; A 135; A 152) and to the beginnings of existence (B 148: the navel grows in the uterus as a support against wandering; A 95: the earth wandered until it became thicker and heavier). Finally, we shall see that in Critias' *Rhadamanthys* wandering connotes greed and instability.

³⁹ The Sophistic writing *Dissoi Logoi*, however, betrays some ethnographic interest in that it uses oppositions between the customs of different peoples: cf. Kerferd (1981) 112.

⁴⁰ Cf. Kerferd (1981) *passim*, esp. 15 and 23, 42.

⁴¹ Cf. Kerferd (1981) 44–5; Rankin (1983) 38.

⁴² With Stanford (1968) 96, one can read Gorgias' and, more generally, the Sophists' depreciation of Odysseus in the light of 'the common tendency to be severest on others for one's own dearest faults'.

⁴³ Cf. *Il.* 9.648, 16.59; *Od.* 17.245–6, 20.377, 21.327 and 400.

⁴⁴ ...τὸν μαθήματα συνωνούμενον πόλιν τε ἐκ πόλεως νομίσματος ἀμείβοντα... (*Sph.* 224b 1–2).

man attached to material goods.⁴⁵ In order to trade knowledge, the Sophist trades cities as well: the cities, and not the articles of knowledge, are the explicit objects of the Sophist's traffic. Nomadism as such is merchandising: the Sophist gives up one city for another if he is paid better. Moreover, the Sophist's nomadism reflects the deceptive and unsettled nature of his rhetorical wanderings: 'As to the race of the Sophists, I consider them experts in many beautiful speeches of other kinds, but I am afraid that being a race of wanderers (γένος...πλανητόν) from city to city, and never having habitations of their own, they miss the mark in regard to men who are both philosophers and statesmen, whatever they might do or say in times of war...' (*Ti.* 19e 2–8). Nomadism is in keeping with the Sophists' ability to produce variegated speeches, but at odds with knowledge. Plato's wandering Sophist resembles the changeable earthly appearances, which likewise wander: 'We have then found, as it seems, that the many conventions of the many about the beautiful and other things are somehow tossed about between that which is not and that which is in the purest sense...It must be called pertaining to opinion, not knowable, the thing wandering between (τὸ μεταξύ πλανητόν), seized by the faculty that is in between' (*Rep.* 5.479d 3–9). The wanderings of the Sophist within the wandering realm of opinion highlight his unphilosophical nature and match his ability to assume any shape, like a wizard. Wandering is a manifestation of the Sophist's fleeting mutability, which in turn gives rise to a multiplication of definitions.⁴⁶ In sum, the Sophist's wanderings connote verbal deceptions, greed, and an evasive, slippery nature. The wandering Sophist is an Odyssean figure, but viewed under a negative light. While Homeric Odysseus learns from his wanderings, the Sophist's wanderings betray lack of knowledge.

This disparaging attribution of wandering to the Sophists makes it doubtful whether Plato, as it has been thought,⁴⁷ romanticized the wandering philosopher and thereby inaugurated the Western romanticization of wandering. True, Plato often describes the participants in his dialogues as engaging in discussion while they are walking, a pattern which suggests that he valued the movement of the body in itself as an activity conducive to concentration. But this does not mean that he romanticized wandering. The walking philosopher is hardly a wanderer. Because of its unstructured quality, wandering, unlike walking, harmonizes with disorder, with the frontiers of the civilized world. The wanderer roams the sea, the wilderness, the desert—the 'Wandering Plain'. His endless and centrifugal movement covers the entire earth, or even crosses the cosmic elements.

Conversely, the walking characters in Plato's dialogues always have a destination and contain their movement within a delimited and civilized space; they do not haunt the wilderness or the desert. Socrates' statement in the *Phaedrus*, 'trees and open country do not teach me anything, but the men in the city do' (230d 5–6), can be read as the ultimate rejection of the posture of the lonely wanderer who yearns for isolated places and whose mind responds to the stimuli of

⁴⁵ In the *Republic* (2. 371d 5–7), Plato distinguishes the *emporoi*, wandering merchants (πλανήτας) who bring their goods from city to city, from the *kapêloi*, who are fixed in the agora and sell what is brought there. The Sophist is indeed a wandering merchant, an *emporos*, and his activity a traffic in mental goods, *psuchemporikê* (*Sph.* 224a 1–b 4). On the Sophist as an itinerant merchant, cf. also *Prt.* 313d. Plato's uncle Critias had already related wandering to restless ambition and greed in a poetic fragment from the tragedy *Rhadamanthys* (DK 15 B 13–20; on the attribution of this tragedy to Critias, see Kerferd (1981) 52–3): 'all sorts of desires we have in life: the one longs to become a nobleman; the other has no thought of this, but wishes to be called the possessor of many riches in the house; another likes to convince his neighbours, speaking unhealthy thoughts, to dare do evil; other mortals look for shameful gains instead of beauty. Thus, the life of men is a wandering' (οὕτω βίος ἀνθρώπων πλάνη).

⁴⁶ Cf. *Sph.* 235a; *Plt.* 291a 8–c 7 (Sophist = wizard). On the Sophists' disguise, cf. also *Prt.* 316c 5–e 5 with the comments of Kerferd (1981) 20–2. Proteus, the mythic sea-creature who could assume all sorts of shapes, is called 'the Egyptian sophist' (*Euthd.* 288b 8). The difficulty in defining the Sophist pervades the dialogue that bears his name. Cf. Rosen (1983) 100–15 and *passim*; Kerferd (1981) 4–5.

untouched nature.⁴⁸ Even the famous walk in the countryside at the beginning of this dialogue does not take Socrates and his companion to the wilderness, but to a place that bears traces of human presence: the retreat they reach is inhabited by human artifacts (230b 8). Nor does that walk give rise to a solitary dialogue of the mind with itself. It may well be true that Plato thought while walking alone, as he is caricatured by the comic poet Alexis: ‘you come at the right time, for I am at a loss, and although walking up and down like Plato, I have not found any piece of wisdom’ (D.L. 3.27 = *fr.* 151 Kassel–Austin). But this image of Plato going back and forth engrossed in thought does not correspond to the description that he himself gives of walking within the setting of his dialogues. Walking usually provides a frame, thus suggesting the fluidity and unsystematic character of the inquiry. On the one hand, the departure of one or more participants in a dialogue may cut off the discussion, with the result that the search seems to be interrupted, rather than terminated.⁴⁹ On the other hand, the dialogue is often initiated by a walk that leads two or more characters to the place of the discussion.⁵⁰ Plato’s characters—and Socrates above all—have to be on the move to get their minds going. But they need to talk as well. Walking and talking sets the thinking process in motion.

Moreover, walking usually yields to sitting when the actual philosophical search begins. Sitting was already the posture of concentration in Prodicus’ allegory ‘Heracles at the crossroads between Virtue and Vice’, which recasts the hero of toils and physical strength as a philosophical model. When he came of age, Heracles had to decide what kind of life to embrace. Thus ‘he withdrew into solitude and sat’ (ἐξελθόντα εἰς ἡσυχίαν καθῆσθαι) at a crossroads (Xen. *Mem.* 2.1.21). While he was sitting there, two women embodying the pleasurable and the virtuous life appeared to him and each vaunted her superiority. Heracles obviously chose Virtue. The philosophical hero has fought his psychomachy while seated alone. Accordingly, in Plato’s dialogues the transition from the preliminaries to the proper discussion is generally announced by a movement of arrest: the participants finally reach the place of the discussion (usually a house) and sit down.⁵¹ If walking sets the dialogue in motion, sitting allows the mind to follow the discussion closely, to rest on each of its steps.

The beginning of the *Protagoras* highlights the difference between walking and sitting with respect to thinking. While they are waiting to go to see Protagoras, Socrates and Hippocrates decide to walk in the courtyard of Socrates’ house. Only when they start walking does Socrates question his companion: ‘So then we got up and walked around in the courtyard, and to test Hippocrates’ strength I examined and questioned him...’(311a 8–b 2). Protagoras himself is walking and conversing in the portico with a long line of followers when Socrates and Hippocrates arrive at his house (314e 3–315a 5). The topic seems unimportant compared to Protagoras’ charismatic demeanour and charming voice (315a 8–b 1). But as all get ready for the discussion, Callias asks: ‘Would you like to sit together, so that you can talk sitting down?’

⁴⁷ Padel (1995) 110.

⁴⁸ The preference that Socrates gives to city life over nature, besides matching the anthropocentric character of his philosophy, is in keeping with a pervasive tendency in the ancient world to value the works of men much more than the works of nature. Cf. Casson (1994) 229–37.

⁴⁹ For instance, *Ly.* 223a–b 2; *Euthphr.* 15e 3–4; *Men.* 100b 7; *Cra.* 440e 3–5; *Tht.* 210d 2–4. Xenophon imitates this pattern in the *Symposium*. Before the performance of pantomime begins, Autolycus gets up to go for his usual walk, followed by his father (9.1); then, once the performance is over, Socrates and some others join the company on their walk (9.7).

⁵⁰ For instance, *Ly.* 203a–b; *Rep.* 1.327a–328b 4; *Parm.* 126a–127a 1; *Phaedr.* 227a–230b 2.

⁵¹ In the *Lysis*, for instance, the walking party ‘withdrew to the opposite part of the room, and sitting down, as it was quiet there, began to talk to each other’ (207a 3–5). Cf. also *Prt.* 310a 3. The only true exception is the *Laws*, where the entire discussion takes place while walking (although with frequent halts: cf. 625b 2–7). The *Symposium* is an exception only apparently. It is true that Apollodorus narrates Agathon’s party while he and his friend are going from Phalerum to Athens. But Apollodorus is just a reporter, and not an actor in the philosophical contest. The latter takes place while the participants are sitting or reclining, as is customary at the banquet (the verbs ‘to sit’ and ‘to recline’ are used interchangeably: e.g. 175c 7–8 and d 3).

(317d 5–6). Everyone takes his place on benches and the dialogue begins ‘when we were all seated’ (317e 3). Its opening repeats the discussion that Socrates and Hippocrates have had before, while they were walking in Socrates’ courtyard.

Talking and walking warms up the mind. Socrates introduces the topic of the discussion while walking with Hippocrates, but only as a sort of ‘rehearsal’, in preparation for the more demanding challenge that will take place in the seated position.⁵² Sitting down marks the end of the preliminaries and the beginning of the formal dialogue, in climactic contrast with Socrates’ and Hippocrates’ private discussion as well as with Protagoras’ meaningless conversation, both of which take place while walking. A similar pattern can be observed in the *Phaedrus*. When he fell in with Socrates, Phaedrus was going off to the country in order to study Lysias’ speech: he wanted to ‘practise’ it while walking (228b 6). Conversely, the proper discussion (inaugurated by Phaedrus’ reading of the speech) takes place while sitting or reclining (229b 2, 230e 3). Because sitting together has egalitarian overtones in classical Greek culture, I would suggest that this position conveys the ‘egalitarian’ character of the philosophical discussion: the actors are all equally situated to search for a truth which belongs to everyone and to no one.⁵³ Sitting together is the position of sharing.

Plato, however, also describes solitary thinking. But Plato’s solitary thinker, far from being a wanderer, stands immobile. He does not even sit, like Heracles in Prodicus’ allegory. Standing, not walking or wandering, is the metaphorical posture of the philosopher who withdraws from the upheavals of life: ‘remaining quiet and minding his own business, and standing aside (ἀποστᾶς) under shelter of a wall as in a storm of dust and rain brought by the wind ... he is happy if in any way he can live this life free from injustice and unholy deeds...’ (*Rep* 6.496d 6–e 1). Socrates’ most intense intellectual searches take place in this position of standing withdrawal. While he is going with Aristodemus to Agathon’s house at the beginning of the *Symposium*, Socrates suddenly starts lagging behind: ‘Then, Socrates turned his thoughts to himself and walked along the way, falling behind’ (174d 4–6). One of Agathon’s slaves finds the thinker in his mental retreat, standing in the porch next door (175a 8). Indeed, Aristodemus explains that standing immobile is a pattern in Socrates’ behaviour: ‘This is a habit of his. Sometimes he stands aside and remains standing (ἀποστᾶς...ἑστῆκεν) wherever he happens to be’ (175b 1–2). Like the withdrawn philosopher described in the *Republic*, Socrates ‘stands aside’ (*aphistêmi*). This posture alone allows him to ‘find’ and to ‘hold’ what he is seeking (175d 2).

Alcibiades presents Socrates in the same position at the end of the *Symposium*. During the siege of Potidaea, Socrates accomplished an exploit of intellectual endurance that took the form of an unshakable standing immobility:

‘But what that enduring man did and suffered’ during the campaign, it is worth hearing. For, engrossed in thought, he stood there scrutinizing something since dawn, and since he was not advancing in his search, he did not give up but stood there searching. It was already midday when the men realized what was happening; they were surprised and told each other that Socrates had been standing there thinking about something since dawn. At last, when evening came, some Ionians after dinner brought out their pallet-beds (for it was summer then), both to sleep in the cool air and to watch whether he would stand there even all night long. He stood there until morning, when the sun rose. Then he went away having said his prayers to the sun (220c 2–d 5).

⁵² Cf. also *Euthd.* 271a 8–b 7 (the discussion takes place sitting), 272e–273b (a group of men walk about, but finally they sit down to talk).

⁵³ On the egalitarian connotations of this posture in the context of the Greek assembly, cf., for instance, Cic. *Flac.* 7.16.

Socrates' physical endurance was already a *topos* when Plato wrote the *Symposium*. We learn from Aristophanes that in order to be initiated into the mysteries of Socrates, one should never be weary of 'either standing or walking' (οὔθ' ἔστῳς οὔτε βαδίζων).⁵⁴ In the same play, Aristophanes mocks Socrates 'because you walk haughtily in the streets, and bend your eyes sideways, and endure, barefoot, many evils',⁵⁵ a phrase that Alcibiades echoes in the *Symposium* to depict Socrates' enduring walking on the occasion of the retreat from Delium. Then, Socrates proved his superior courage. He did not flee in disorder, but walked away with a calm, steady gait (*Symposium* 221b 2–4).⁵⁶ Socrates' way of walking tells of his physical and moral strength; but only the immobility of the standing position conveys his intellectual endurance. Like Odysseus, to whom the quotation 'what that enduring man did and suffered' refers, Socrates reduces himself to immobility when he wants to withdraw from the external world.⁵⁷

Socrates' thinking while standing is indeed soldier-like. Socrates himself compares his steadfastness as a philosopher with his steadfastness as a soldier. 'I would have been acting horribly', he says in the *Apology*, 'if, when the commanders whom you elected to rule me assigned me to a post at Potidaea, Amphipolis and Delium, I remained (ἔμεινον) at my post like anyone else and risked death, and yet, when god assigned me...to lead the philosophical life and to examine myself and others, through fear of death or of any other thing I should desert my post' (28d 9–29a 2). The behaviour of the hoplite spells out the firmness of the philosophical life. Just as the hoplite does not move away but stands there to face the danger, Socrates remains standing where he is told.⁵⁸ Diogenes Laertius confirms: 'he remained (μειναι) the entire night in one position' (2.23). The military setting of Alcibiades' narrative in the *Symposium* highlights the continuity between the immobile posture of the philosopher and the equally unflinching position of the soldier.⁵⁹ Like the body, the mind ought to be held tight, in a constant centripetal tension.⁶⁰

Unlike the concentrated mind of the standing thinker, a wanderer's mind—like the Sophist's—does not search for the truth but wavers in the world of opinion. Plato's wanderer does not think correctly; nor, as it seems, does he act effectively. Far from romanticizing the wandering philosopher, Plato regrets his own wanderings. As his own life shows, Plato was not

⁵⁴ *Nu.* 415, cited by D.L. 2.27. This quality is part of Socrates *talaipôron*.

⁵⁵ *Nu.* 362–3, cited by D.L. 2.28.

⁵⁶ On Socrates' paradoxical courage, see Loraux (1995) 155. Loraux shows that Socrates subverts the values of hoplite morality by fleeing nobly, while hoplite morality does not conceive of such a thing as a noble flight.

⁵⁷ The citation 'what that enduring man did and suffered' is taken from Hom. *Od.* 4.242 and 271. In 4.271, the phrase introduces the narration of how Odysseus quieted the Achaeans hidden in the Trojan Horse, preventing them from rushing out or from responding to the alluring voice of Helen. Odysseus succeeds in reducing his companions to immobility because he succeeds time and again in remaining immobile himself.

⁵⁸ Cf. Loraux (1995) 158: 'the philosopher stands firm in *logos* as in life'. Loraux observes the frequent occurrences of *menein* in the *Phaedo*. *Menein*, 'to remain', is the hoplite's duty. Even the hoplite's movement has a static quality because of the compact order in which it occurs.

⁵⁹ Similarly, Diogenes Laertius confounds Socrates' intellectual exploit with his military prowess by omitting to say that Socrates stood there 'thinking' (we know from Plato that this is the case, but in Laertius' formulation Socrates' sustained position could also be taken as an exercise of physical endurance). Moreover, immediately after narrating this episode, Laertius says that Socrates won the prize for valour. The reader cannot fail to relate Socrates' military decoration to his intellectual exploit.

⁶⁰ Socrates' intense concentration should not be mistaken for a mystic rapture: cf. Dover (1995) at 220 c 4. The phrase οὐκ ἀνίει (220 c 5), 'he did not give up', that is, he would not 'slacken', 'loosen' the mind, suggests Socrates' mental 'tightness', for ἀνίημι is used for the unstringing of musical instruments. Aristophanes mocks Socrates' techniques of concentration by showing the philosopher ask his student Strepsiades to lie down on a bed and to cover himself (*Nu.* 633, 694, 727, 735). From this unusual position, Strepsiades will engage in a very loose search; far from focusing on one and the same idea, he will drop any idea that may cause embarrassment and 'move on' (744); his mind will benefit from some airing, from a 'slackening toward the sky' (762–3).

against travelling.⁶¹ But when he calls his travels to Sicily *planê*, he emphasizes the failure of his mission. In the *Seventh Letter* (350 d 5–6), Plato says that ‘he hated his Sicilian wanderings and misfortune’ (...μεμισσηκῶς τὴν περὶ Σικελίαν πλάνην καὶ ἀτυχίαν).⁶² The term *planê* conveys the ineffectiveness of the journeys and the unwillingness of the traveller.⁶³ Plato indeed depicts himself as a passive traveller, an avatar of Odysseus the suffering wanderer (345 d 8–e 1): he has been ‘forced’ to go to Sicily for the third time and ‘again to cross in its length deadly Charybdis’.⁶⁴ By means of this Homeric quotation, Plato identifies with Odysseus, but he views wandering under a purely negative light: unlike Odysseus, Plato has not acquired extensive knowledge from his toilsome wanderings.

It is true that at the beginning of the *Sophist* Plato does not attach these negative connotations of wandering to the philosopher. Socrates describes the true philosopher as a wanderer whose epiphanies resemble those of Homeric gods:

These men—not the counterfeit but the true philosophers—appearing in ‘all sorts of shapes’ because of the ignorance of the others, ‘turn in and out from city to city’ looking down from the heights on the lives of those below. To some they seem worthy of nothing, to others of everything. At times they appear as statesmen, at times as sophists, and at times they may give the impression of being totally mad.⁶⁵

The image of the philosopher who goes from place to place is not a negative one in this passage. Plato seems eager to differentiate from the start this figure from the wandering Sophist: later in this dialogue, the wandering Sophist will be called a merchant, while the wandering philosopher is a judge; his disguise, unlike the Sophist’s, is not meant to deceive, but depends on the ignorance of the non-philosophers who cannot see his real image.⁶⁶ Like a god, the philosopher inhabits too bright a region for mortal eyes to reach.⁶⁷ However, Plato does not idealize the philosopher *qua* wanderer. Wandering connotes the unknowability of this figure rather than describing an actual behaviour. The philosopher is a wanderer in the sense that he can hardly be spotted and grasped. Plato draws on the wider cultural association of wandering with elusiveness, although the elusiveness of a true philosopher is not in his nature, as in the case of Odysseus (or, negatively, of the Sophists), but in the deficient eyes of the beholder. By conjuring up this undefinable figure at the beginning of a dialogue that aims at distinguishing the

⁶¹ His ideal philosopher is called to educate both his own citizens and others. In the *Sophists*, the tension between these complementary roles of the philosopher is reflected in Plato’s double ‘disguise’: on the one hand as Socrates, who never left Athens, and on the other as the Eleatic Stranger, who is visiting Athens from abroad to make a gift of his knowledge. On the opposition between Socrates and the Eleatic Stranger, cf. Rosen (1983) 108.

⁶² Cf. also 344 d 3.

⁶³ Plato uses *planê* and cognates much more frequently in a disparaging than in a neutral sense. The neutral instances are *Ti.* 38 c 5, 39 d 1, 40 b 7; [*Epin.*] 986 b 2; *Lg.* 7. 821 b 9 and c 4 (‘planets, movement of the planets’); *Lg.* 3.683 a 3 (‘digression’); *Lg.* 1. 633 c 3 (wandering as a component of Spartan education); *Ap.* 22 a 7 (Socrates’ wandering; see *infra*); *Plt.* 264 c 7 (touring); *Rep.* 2.371 d 7 (wandering merchants; see *supra*). In all the other instances, wandering has strongly negative meanings: mainly, it is a metaphor for intellectual confusion, unsteadiness, deficiencies (for instance, *Rep.* 6.484 b 6, 505 c 7; [*Hp.Mi.*] 376 c 3–7; *Sph.* 230 b 5, 245 e 5; *Parm.* 135 e 3, 136 e 2; *planaomai* is most often used in this sense) and belongs with the body as opposed to the soul, with opinion as opposed to knowledge (for instance, *Phd.* 79 d 5, 81 a 6; *Alc.* 1.117 a 10–12; *Men.* 248 a 2; *Ti.* 43 b 6, 47 c 4, 88 e 3, 91 c 5; *Rep.* 5.479 d 9, 9.586 a 3; *Ti.* 19 e 4; see *supra*).

⁶⁴ Hom. *Od.* 12.428.

⁶⁵ ἄνδρες οὗτοι ‘παντοῖοι’ φανταζόμενοι διὰ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἀγνοίαν ‘ἐπιστροφῶσι πόλῃας’, οἱ μὴ πλαστῶς ἀλλ’ ὄντως φιλόσοφοι καθορῶντες ὑψόθεν τὸν τῶν κάτω βίον, καὶ τοῖς μὲν δοκοῦσιν εἶναι τοῦ μηδενὸς τίμιοι, τοῖς δ’ ἀξιοὶ τοῦ παντός· καὶ τοῖς μὲν πολιτικοῖς φαντάζονται, τοτὲ δὲ σοφισταί, τοτὲ δ’ ἔστιν οἷς δόξαν παράσχοιεν· ἄν ὡς παντάπασιν ἔχοντες μανικῶς (216 c 4–d 2). The quoted words are from Hom. *Od.* 17. 485–6. Even though he uses ἐπιστροφεῖν, Socrates is referring to wandering philosophers. For the lines from the *Odyssey* apply to a wanderer, Odysseus (ἀλήτην at 483). See *supra*.

⁶⁶ Cf. Movia (1994) 46. On the difficulty of recognizing the philosopher, cf. also Bluck (1975) 30–1.

⁶⁷ Cf. also *Sph.* 254 a 8–b 1.

philosopher from the Sophist and the statesman, Plato suggests the difficulty of such a task. Should the philosopher be defined, he would cease to be a wanderer.

But what about Socrates' wanderings? According to what Plato has him say in the *Apology*, Socrates went 'wandering' (he uses the word *planê*) all over the city of Athens in order to verify the Delphic oracle that had proclaimed him the wisest of all men; to prove its truth, he searched everywhere for a person wiser than himself (22a–e).⁶⁸ Socrates highlights in traditional terms his alleged unwillingness to set off to wander: his wanderings are 'labours', *ponous*; they are an obligation (cf. 21e 5: ἰτέον), a constraint (21e 4: ἀναγκαῖον), a servitude (23c 1). By emphasizing his passivity, Socrates dresses himself up as an embodiment of Heracles, who was likewise forced to wander and whose labours had been as beneficial to mankind as Socrates claims his own to be. Undoubtedly Socrates sets himself up as a wandering hero. But in what sense? Can we infer from this picture that Plato romanticized the wandering philosopher?

Plato's Socrates does not endow wandering with any symbolic meaning; going about is just a means to make contact, to engage in dialogue. Plato casts Socrates' wandering as a miniature (a mockery?) of Presocratic travels. Like Solon according to Herodotus, Socrates embarks on his wandering (in both cases the term is *planê*) for the sake of *sophia*. But the result of Socrates' wandering is only negative knowledge (no one is wise; therefore, what the oracle meant is that there is hardly any human *sophia*). Unlike Solon, who has acquired positive knowledge through his wanderings, Socrates has only acquired the knowledge that there is no one who knows. Moreover, the very choice of the word *planê* has ironical overtones when applied to the man who loathed travelling.⁶⁹ Unlike the extensive travels of the Presocratics, Socrates' wanderings cover very little distance: they are confined to the city of Athens.

In sum, Plato did not romanticize wandering, let alone the wandering philosopher. Along traditional lines, he associated wandering with passivity and suffering on the one hand, with deception, elusiveness, and even greed on the other. He presented Socrates' wanderings (no matter how urgent their motivation) as a simple means to make contact, without adding any significance to the act of wandering in itself. Rather than romanticizing the wandering philosopher, Plato romanticized the standing thinker. This is not surprising, given that Plato was the first philosopher to choose a permanent setting for his teaching, the Academy. This founding seems to materialize in stone his conviction that a nomadic attitude does not help the cause of philosophy.⁷⁰

By contrast, his younger contemporary (and opponent) Diogenes the Cynic was convinced that a nomadic attitude not only helped the cause of philosophy, but also was the *condicio sine qua non* for the philosophical life. Diogenes may well have been 'a philosopher in a recognizably Greek tradition—a walking and talking philosopher'.⁷¹ The practice of walking while talking was indeed becoming more and more common in philosophical circles, as suggested by the very names of Aristotle's and Zeno's schools.⁷² Diogenes, however, did not present himself as

⁶⁸ Cf. also *Ap.* 23b 5, 31c 5; *Rep.* 1.338b 2.

⁶⁹ Cf. *Cri.* 52 b; D.L. 2.22.

⁷⁰ Cf. Rankin (1983) 163: 'By establishing a permanent base for his philosophical teaching, he [Plato] made a considerable departure from the more individualistic semi-nomadic life of the Sophists, or the informal conversations of a citizen with time on his hands like Socrates.'

⁷¹ Long (1996) 31. The Cynic *Letters of Diogenes* often present the philosopher in the act of walking when he falls in with someone.

⁷² On the Peripatos, cf. D.L. 5.2: Aristotle 'chose the promenade (περίπατον) in the Lyceum, and...walking up and down with his pupils he discussed philosophy with them: hence they are called *peripatêtikoi*' (5.2). On the Stoa, cf. D.L. 7.5. See also Suid. 3413 s.v. Στωϊκοί. Diogenes Laertius reports (7.109 = SVF 3.135, fr. 496) that, according to the Stoics, to live following virtue is always a duty, whereas this is not the case with 'asking questions, giving answers, walking and similar things': is this sequence just a random list of activities or does it reflect the practice of walking and talking in philosophical circles? Cf. also Stob. 2. 96, 18 (= SVF 3. 136, fr. 501). Seneca's teacher Attalus too was accustomed to philosophize while walking (*Ep.* 108.3). For *ambulatio* does not hinder concentration (*Ep.* 15.6). In the Hellenistic period, this practice also spread among Socratic and Academic philosophers (cf. D.L. 2.130, 4.19). Its diffusion may explain why Athenodorus, one of the sources of Diogenes Laertius, gave the title 'Walks' to

a walking philosopher in the Greek tradition, but as an outcast wanderer. He used to say that ‘All the curses of tragedy...had lighted upon him’. At all events he was ‘Without a city, without a home, bereft of country, /A beggar, a wanderer, living day by day’ (ἄπολις, ἄοικος, πατρίδος ἐστερημένος / πτωχός, πλανήτης, βίον ἔχων τοῦφ’ ἡμέραν).⁷³ This is the first time that a philosopher proudly embraces the figure of the homeless wanderer. It is not by chance that this innovation belongs to Diogenes, the declared enemy of all social conventions. Aelian emphasizes Diogenes’ pride in attaching these curses of tragedy to himself: ‘He prided himself on these attributes no less than Alexander on his dominion over the inhabited world’ (*VH* 3.29).

Diogenes’ provocative appropriation of the image of the outcast wanderer goes hand in hand with his equally provocative rejection of the city—of any city—as a place defining one’s social identity. The Cynic philosopher is credited with having been the first to call himself a *kosmopolitês*.⁷⁴ He used to say: ‘the only right government is that which extends to the universe (μόνην τε ὀρθὴν πολιτείαν εἶναι τῆν ἐν κόσμῳ)’ (D.L. 6.72). It is true that already Democritus had claimed that the world at large should be one’s country: ‘The entire earth can be trodden by the wise. For the fatherland of the good mind is the whole world’ (DK 68 B). However, Democritus’ cosmopolitan ideal is not at odds with his acceptance of the individual cities, whose diversity of customs and laws he explains as the result of different historical conditions.⁷⁵ On the one hand, the wise man should aspire to the higher goal of cosmopolitanism, but on the other hand, the good citizen must abide by the laws of the city. In keeping with this ideal, Democritus’ own behaviour, as we have seen, remains that of the traveller eager to increase his knowledge, as opposed to that of the outcast wanderer.⁷⁶

By contrast, Diogenes the Cynic is not well known for his extensive travels.⁷⁷ When he claims to be a wanderer and a cosmopolitan, he does not appeal to the image of the learned inquirer who has widened his horizons through contacts with different peoples and places. He does not mean to present himself as a world-explorer but to show himself unattached to any place. Diogenes’ positive appropriation of the posture of the homeless wanderer belongs with his negative concept of cosmopolitanism.⁷⁸ Exiled from his city, perhaps on account of having

a book on the lives of philosophers (D.L. 5.36, 6.81, 9.42). The spreading of the philosophical walk is probably related to the more general spreading of walking as a leisurely activity. Even though the Greeks valued leisurely walking already in the fifth and fourth centuries BC (cf. Bremmer (1991) 19), the impressive improvements in city planning and the development of tourism from the Hellenistic period onwards may have contributed to the diffusion of this practice. At least in Roman times, vacationing included strolling among its pleasures, as the architecture of many a Roman villa, with its shadowy alleys and porticos, suggests (cf. Casson (1994) 138–48).

⁷³ D.L. 6.38 = TGF *Adesp.* 284. The ancient sources agree in attributing this saying, or variants of it, to Diogenes. Cf. Jul. Or. 9. 256d, 6.195b; Arr. *Epict.* 3 22.45–7 and 4.8.31; Ael. *VH* 3.29. This unanimous agreement (whereas in attributing many other sayings our sources disagree) suggests that Diogenes’ statement could hardly be attributed to anyone else.

⁷⁴ D.L. 6.63. This attribution is probably correct; cf. Höistad (1948) 141–2; Moles (1993) 260. Höistad cites a passage from Lucian’s *Philosophers for Sale* (8) that supports the attribution. Asked where he was from, Diogenes answered: ‘You see a citizen of the world’ (τοῦ κόσμου πολίτην).

⁷⁵ Cf. Lana (1951) 213–15, also Baldry (1965) 58.

⁷⁶ See *supra* and D.L. 9.35–6.

⁷⁷ Cf. Navia (1996) 87. Diogenes spent his philosophical career either in Athens, or in Corinth, or between these two cities.

⁷⁸ It is widely agreed that Diogenes advocates a negative form of cosmopolitanism, one that denies adherence to any individual community instead of asserting a universal community of men. Cf. Sayre (1938) 12–13 and 119–21; Baldry (1965) 108; Ungefehr-Kortus (1996) 100–1; Navia (1996) 24 n.61, 101, 137–8. Navia draws a parallel between the saying attributed to Anaxagoras (see *supra*) and Diogenes’ negative cosmopolitanism (102). But Diogenes does not even advocate the superior *kosmos* of the mind as one’s only true citizenship. On Diogenes’ negative cosmopolitanism, cf. also Lana (1951) 194 n.2 and 338; Dorandi (1993) 68. *Contra*: Moles (1993). In arguing that Cynic cosmopolitanism has a positive side, Moles insists that Diogenes did not say ‘I am *apolis*’ when asked where he came from (264). But he did so when he attributed the ‘curses of tragedy’ to himself! In my opinion, Moles’ interpretation minimizes the difference between Cynic and Stoic positions (see esp. 277), for the Stoics undoubtedly propounded a positive form of cosmopolitanism. Cf. Navia (1996) 113.

adulterated the local coinage, Diogenes lives in exile both literally and metaphorically.⁷⁹ Only this condition, he claims, made him a philosopher (D.L. 6.49). Homelessness of body becomes the prerequisite for the philosophical life. Diogenes converts his punishment into a blessing: it is not the people of Sinope that have sentenced him to exile, but he who has sentenced them to 'residence' in their city (D.L. 6.49).⁸⁰

Diogenes extols the condition of the exile *per se*, and not because it grants one the freedom to choose a new city. According to Epictetus, 'the entire earth was fatherland to him alone, and he chose none' (πάσα γῆ πατρίς ἦν ἐκείνῳ μόνῳ, ἐξάρετος δ' οὐδεμία) (Arr. *Epict.* 3.24.64–6). The cosmopolitan who does not choose a place (at least in theory) is indifferent to location. He uses 'any place for anything' (D.L. 6.22: παντὶ τόπῳ ἐχρήτο εἰς πάντα), for it is not the place that defines something as out of place, but the act itself: 'If to breakfast is not *atopon*, neither is it *atopon* in the market-place; but to breakfast is not *atopon*, therefore it is not *atopon* to breakfast in the market-place' (6.69). A man of all places—of no place—Diogenes had no school. In contrast to Platonism, Cynicism is homeless.⁸¹

In keeping with his image as an exiled homeless man, Diogenes extols wandering as a private exercise. Through wandering, he gets rid of everything and thus achieves the supreme Cynic value, freedom.⁸² '...he stripped himself of the chains and went around the earth, free, like a bird with reasoning, not fearing the lord, not constrained by law, not deprived of leisure by politics...' (Max.Tyr. 36.5).⁸³ Diogenes the wanderer is like the famous mouse whose perpetual movement taught him to live without a shelter (D.L. 6.22).

The Cynic glamorization of wandering emerges from their choice of wandering heroes as paragons of behaviour. Heracles, Odysseus, and the Scythian sage Anacharsis became models of Cynic wisdom. In a Cynicizing passage, Epictetus insists that we are not meant to be rooted in one place, but to move around,

⁷⁹ Cf. [Diog.] *Ep.* 1.1; Plu. *Mor.* 662a; D. L. 6.49; Branham (1993) 455. On the episode of the adulteration of the coinage and its allegorical interpretation (deface the local currency = subvert conventional moral values), cf. Sayre (1938) 65; Höistad (1948) 10–12; Paquet (1975) 59 n.1; Onfray (1990) 116–17; Navia (1996) 90–3.

⁸⁰ Cf. also Plu. *Mor.* 602a; [Diog.] *Ep.* 1.1. Lucian (*Vit. auct.* 9) considers 'leaving the paternal house' as one of the tenets of Cynic philosophy. A milder version of Diogenes' praise of exile as a prerequisite for the philosophical life can be found in Arr. *Epict.* 3.16.11. However, Diogenes' proclaimed indifference to all places does not imply a renunciation of the world; cf. Long (1996) 39–40. In so far as he does not renounce the world, the Cynic wanderer differs significantly from the Christian ascetic. The two figures have been compared since late antiquity (cf. Sayre (1948) 27; Downing (1993) 282 and 286; Anderson (1994) 6; Matton (1996) 240–64). Still in the Middle Ages, Christian ascetics, like Diogenes, embraced a life of *peregrinatio* by exiling themselves from their fatherland (cf. Ladner (1967) 233–59). For the Christian ascetic, however, to be a wanderer means to emphasize the fleeting condition of our life on earth. It is possible that Diogenes, too, associated wandering with the fragility of the human condition, if these lines belong to one of his tragedies (Stobaeus, one of the sources for this fragment, attributes it to Sophocles): 'Human race, mortal and miserable/ We are but reflections of shades/ who wander, a useless weight, on earth' (4.2.34, 1= TGF 859). But the Cynic wanderer does not know of any other dwelling than the earth where he wanders.

⁸¹ It is even debated whether the Cynosarges hosted Antisthenes' teaching; cf. Giannantoni (1993) 15–34; Billot (1993) 69–116; Navia (1996) 16. Whatever the answer, Diogenes did not teach there. Therefore, in order to associate the Cynosarges with the Cynics one must give credit to the traditional affiliation Antisthenes–Diogenes, which is far from certain. But even if the Cynosarges is connected with the Cynics, what other place could be more '*atopos*' with respect to the conventional social norms? A gymnasium for non-citizens, the Cynosarges was located outside the city walls. It was the space of the outcast, of the wanderer. Cf. Onfray (1990) 19: 'Au Cynosarge se retrouvaient les exclus de la citoyenneté... L'école cynique voit donc le jour en banlieue, loin des quartiers riches, dans un espace consacré aux exclus et aux laissés-pour-compte de l'orgueil grec.'

⁸² The tragic fragment that Diogenes attributes to himself begins with two privative adjectives (*a-polis*, *a-oikos*) followed by 'bereft of country'. Cynic freedom is especially negative: cf. Höistad (1948) 15; Goulet-Cazé (1986) 19–20. On freedom as the supreme Cynic value (instead of 'nature' or 'self-sufficiency'), cf. Branham (1993) 463.

⁸³ On Diogenes' wandering as an image of his freedom, cf. also [Diog.] *Ep.* 34.22–3: 'I roam the entire earth, a free man, under father Zeus, fearing none of the great lords.'

at times because of some necessity, at times for the sake of the spectacle itself. And it is something of this kind that happened to Odysseus: 'he saw the cities and learned the minds of many men'. And even before, it fell to Heracles to go around the entire inhabited world, 'seeing the haughty and the just behaviour of men', purifying the world by throwing out the one, and introducing the other. Yet, how many friends do you think he had in Thebes, how many in Athens, and how many did he acquire going around? He even married, when he saw fit, and begot children and then left them without groaning or longing for them (Arr. *Epict.* 3.24.12–14).⁸⁴

Epictetus presents the condition of the wanderer as 'natural' (12) and pleasurable. His Odysseus travels not only 'because of some necessity', in keeping with the Homeric picture of the hero, but also 'for the sake of the spectacle itself'. This un-Homeric recasting of the unwilling wanderer as a tourist puts forward the happy disposition and even the initiative of the wanderer. Epictetus' Odysseus, who goes about to contemplate the world, resembles Horace's, an example of Stoic *uirtus* and *sapientia* because of his wanderings: 'the tamer of Troy, who, with forethought, observed the cities and the customs of many men, and, while he was preparing the return for himself and his companions, endured much hardship on the vast sea, undrownable by the waves of adversity' (*Ep.* 1.219–22). Odysseus the wanderer not only 'endures', but also 'sees forward' (*prouidus*) and 'examines' (*inspexit*).⁸⁵ Even though Epictetus and Horace, in a Stoic fashion, emphasize in Odysseus' wanderings the coincidence of necessity and pleasure, of destiny and will, their Odysseus speaks like the Presocratics or the first historians who satisfied their intellectual curiosity in their wanderings.

In this respect, Epictetus' position is not original. But the introduction of Heracles into the picture adds a privative meaning to wandering. Heracles appeals to Epictetus as the prototype of the cosmopolitan wanderer who is urged to move on and does not regret leaving things behind. As a non-Athenian, whose temple stood next to the gymnasium for non-citizens on the Cynosarges, Heracles lent himself to being cast as a homeless, cosmopolitan wanderer.⁸⁶ Epictetus reads Heracles' cosmopolitan wanderings in the light of the Cynic–Stoic ideal of emotional detachment. Albeit inflicted on him,⁸⁷ wandering allows Heracles to display his superior knowledge and independence. Heracles is like a god who wanders to judge the deeds of men without attaching himself to anything or anyone.⁸⁸

Likewise, the Cynics seem to have admired Anacharsis' wanderings as a token of independence and self-sufficiency. The main reason for their idealization of Anacharsis was probably his Scythian accent. Unlike other legendary characteristics of the sage, Anacharsis' way of speaking is emphasized only in Cynic writings (in particular, in the *Letters of Anacharsis*).

⁸⁴ The quotation is from Hom. *Od.* 17.487. On Epictetus' Cynic inspiration in this passage, see Höistad (1948) 34. Höistad compares this passage with Arr. *Epict.* 2.16.44, where Heracles similarly stands out as the *perierchomenos* hero.

⁸⁵ A comparison with the beginning of the *Odyssey* shows the distance between Horace's and Homer's hero with respect to wandering. *πλάγχθη* (*Od.* 1.2) disappears from Horace's version; *inspexit* highlights Odysseus' visual and mental activity more than Homeric ἴδεν (*Od.* 1.3); finally, *prouidus* is absent from Homer, unless it translates *πολύτροπος*. But in this case, while *πολύτροπος* means 'turned in many ways' as much as 'of many turns', *prouidus* refers only to Odysseus' mental alertness, not to his passivity as a wanderer.

⁸⁶ Cf. Höistad (1948) 34.

⁸⁷ As early as the *Homeric Hymn to Heracles*, Heracles' wanderings are presented as a feat of endurance, in very similar terms as those of Odysseus: '...who beforehand, wandering over the immense earth and the sea under the commands of lord Eurystheus, did many reckless things, and many endured' (4–6: ὅς πρὶν μὲν κατὰ γαῖαν ἀθέσφατον ἠδὲ θάλασσαν / πλαζόμενος πομπῆισιν ὑπ' Εὐρυσθέως ἀνακτος / πολλά μὲν αὐτὸς ἔρεξεν ἀτάσθαλα, πολλὰ δ' ἀνέτλη). In Euripides' *Heracles*, Amphitryon says of him (1196–7): 'You could not see another mortal who suffered and wandered more' (οὐκ ἄν εἰδείης ἕτερον / πολυμοχθότερον πολυπλαγκτότερόν τε θνατῶν).

⁸⁸ The line 'seeing the haughty and the just behaviour of men' (*Od.* 17.487) follows the two lines about the wandering gods that Plato refers to the true philosophers in the *Sophist*. Cf. *supra*.

Anacharsis' barbarian accent could easily appeal to the Cynics because of their preference for 'deeds' over 'words'.⁸⁹

However, the Cynics could not ignore another characteristic of Anacharsis that had already become legendary: as a Scythian, Anacharsis was a paradigm of nomadic existence, a prototype of the wanderer. Lucian gives to his presentation of wandering Anacharsis a distinct Cynic twist. In the *Anacharsis*, Solon jokingly suggests that the Scythian sage should be the educator of the Athenians. Anacharsis rejoins with his usual wit: 'How could I, a nomad and a wanderer (νομάς καὶ πλάνης), who has lived in a chariot exchanging one land for another at different times, and has never dwelt in a city or seen one except now, relate about politics and teach men born from the soil, who have inhabited this very old city for such a long time in good order...?' (18). This Anacharsis recalls Diogenes: both attach the label of the wanderer to themselves in the first person. Like Diogenes, Anacharsis does not call himself a wanderer to convey his experience of the world (he has only crossed land after land and not seen a single city); rather, he points to his consistent nomadic life-style that characterizes him as the opposite of the autochthonous Athenian. In emphasizing that nomadism is incompatible with *politeia*, Anacharsis echoes the Cynic ideal of the wanderer alien to the administration of the city.⁹⁰ Similarly, Plutarch's presentation of Anacharsis in the *Banquet of the Seven Sages* (*Mor.* 155 a–b) matches Diogenes' description of himself as a wanderer and an exile. Plutarch depicts Anacharsis as homeless and proud to be so (σεμνύνεται τῶι ἄοικος εἶναι). His nomadism compares him to the sun, 'free' (ἐλεύθερος) and 'ruled by himself' (αὐτόνομος), two attributes worthy of a Cynic.⁹¹

The *Letters of Anacharsis* show which were the characteristics of the Scythian hero *qua* nomad that a Cynic could admire. Rather than just repeating a *topos*, the *Letters* interpret this *topos* in Cynic terms. Anacharsis' nomadism is the equivalent of Cynic 'pantopia' and negative freedom. In *Letter 5*, Anacharsis says: 'the entire earth is my bed', a statement that recalls Diogenes' 'using any place for anything'.⁹² In *Letter 9*, he praises the Scythians' invincibility due to their simple life as gatherers rather than as farmers. The Scythians have nothing, therefore they do not need to defend themselves. This idealization of the Scythians' nomadic life can be found already in Ephorus.⁹³ The Scythians' life-style keeps them 'out', *ektos*, of the sin of property, just as Diogenes kept himself 'out' of all ambition and material business.⁹⁴ The theme of 'exit' is at the core of the Cynic practice of wandering. Cynic wandering is an exercise in estrangement and dispossession, a way out: the wanderer gets out of his material and social constraints, he strips them from his body and mind. By doing so, he becomes as invulnerable as the

⁸⁹ Martin (1996) 152–4.

⁹⁰ His words reverse the negative meaning that Plato attributed to the same association of wandering and political incompetence in the *Sophist*: cf. *supra*. Maximus Tyrius also associates Diogenes' wandering and his indifference to politics (36.5, cited *supra*). On the presence of Cynic elements in the *Anacharsis*, see Kindstrand (1981) 66–7. Kindstrand argues that none of the characters should be regarded as Cynic, but that Lucian used material provided by the Cynics in composing the dialogue.

⁹¹ Cf. Martin (1996) 147. On the possible Cynic influence on Plutarch's treatise, cf. also Kindstrand (1981) 48. On Anacharsis' wanderings, cf. also Aelian: 'The Scythians wander (πλανῶνται) around their own land, whereas Anacharsis, a wise man, pushed his wandering (πλάνην) even further. He came to Greece, and Solon admired him' (*VH* 5.7). But this Anacharsis is not a Cynic wanderer: like Solon (and Anacharsis himself) according to Herodotus, he travels for the sake of *sophia*, and not to propound nomadism as a life-style (although Aelian leaves it unclear whether Anacharsis came to Greece to teach or to learn: he says only 'because he was a wise man', ἄτε δὲ νῆρ σοφός).

⁹² The presence of Cynic elements in *Letter 5* has been noticed by Kindstrand (1981) 64. On κοίτη πᾶσα γῆ, 'the entire earth', rather than 'the naked earth', cf. Ungefehr-Kortus (1996) 99.

⁹³ In *Str.* 7.3.9; cf. Kindstrand (1981) 62, 64; Cremonini (1991) 19. Kindstrand argues that *Letter 5* depends on Ephorus' passage.

⁹⁴ See [Anach.] *Ep.* 9 with the comments of Cremonini (1991) 27–8.

Scythian nomads.⁹⁵ If it is true that Diogenes may have heard of Anacharsis in Sinope,⁹⁶ stories about Anacharsis' nomadic life-style may have inspired Diogenes' self-presentation as a wanderer. In [Diog.] *Ep.* 34.3, the Cynic philosopher claims that Antisthenes gave him the purse 'in order that you take your house around' (ἵνα...τῆν οἰκίαν...περιφέρῃς), a phrase that echoes almost *verbatim* Herodotus' description of the Scythian nomads (4.46: φερέοικοι). The parallels between the Cynic interpretation of Anacharsis' nomadism and Diogenes' interpretation of his own wanderings can be read as the result of a mutual relationship between the two: on the one hand, the Cynics' experience of wandering seems to have influenced their reading of Anacharsis; but on the other hand, the first Cynic who called himself a wanderer may have moulded his image on the nomadic hero. The Cynic wanderer reproduces on an individual scale the invincibility of the Scythian nomads.

After Diogenes, several Cynics embraced the behaviour of the homeless wanderer, thus putting into practice their principle that moral messages should be conveyed by concrete gestures, by performance.⁹⁷ But the Cynics were not alone. Sages from all sects roamed the Mediterranean world. Yet, even in imperial times wandering remained connected with Cynicism. In the *Cynicus* attributed to Lucian (but probably spurious), wandering defines the Cynic as Cynic. The opening of this dialogue, a discussion between a Cynic and a non-Cynic about the qualities of the simple life, puts wandering in the foreground of Cynic practice: 'What are you...who preferring the wandering and solitary life—the life of a beast—(τὸν ἀλήτην καὶ ἀπάνθρωπον βίον καὶ θηριώδη) and treating your own body in the opposite fashion to the majority of men, go about from place to place (περινοστεῖς ἄλλοτε ἄλλαχού) sleeping on the hard ground...?'⁹⁸

A life of wandering, solitude, and bestiality is the token of recognition of the Cynic. Since this text is sympathetic to Cynicism, we can infer that a Cynic would agree on this presentation of himself as a solitary and bestial wanderer. Indeed, the *Cynicus* interprets wandering along the same lines as Cynic sources or in keeping with sayings attributed to Diogenes. As in the case of Diogenes, the wandering sage described in the *Cynicus* removes himself from human society and joins the animal world; in both cases, physical hardship and cosmopolitanism belong with wandering.⁹⁹

The Cynics are thus the first philosophers in Greece to reverse explicitly the pejorative connotations widely associated with the figure of the lonely, exiled wanderer. They attach to themselves the label of the outcast wanderer as a permanent condition. Being a homeless wanderer is not a curse, for privation means freedom and self-reliance. The wandering Cynic detaches himself from any political, social and material bond that he rejects by the very act of wandering. But, for all that, he does not resort to wandering in order to withdraw into his thoughts. By pre-

⁹⁵ Already Herodotus viewed the nomadism of the Scythians as an effective military strategy. Cf. Payen (1997) 321–33. Cf. also Ungefähr-Kortus (1996) 41–2.

⁹⁶ Martin (1996) 155.

⁹⁷ Martin (1996) 154 speaks of 'street theatre' for the Cynics. On their performative usage of the body, cf. also Sayre (1948) 4; Goulet-Cazé (1986) 11; Branham (1993) 468; Navia (1996) 9. The Cynic emphasis on performative gestures has pushed some authors to regard Cynicism as a way of life rather than as a philosophical school. The controversy, already documented by Diogenes Laertius (6.103), has been carried on in modern times. For an overview, see Goulet-Cazé (1986) 28–31. Hegel, for instance, denied Cynicism the quality of a philosophy proper: cf. Onfray (1990) 89. However, this controversy does not do justice to the true nature of Cynic teaching, in which the doctrine cannot be separated from the act. On Cynic anti-intellectualism, cf. also Rankin (1983) 229; Anderson (1994) 6. On Cynic wanderers in Roman times, cf. Rankin (1983) 247–8. Specifically on Peregrinus Proteus, Anderson (1994) 34–5 and *passim*; Navia (1996) 178.

⁹⁸ On this passage, cf. Lovejoy and Boas (1980) 136–45, whose translation I borrow. The fact that the *Cynicus* is probably spurious does not affect my argument, which relies on shared (rather than individual) perceptions about Cynic wandering.

⁹⁹ Cf. esp. Lucianus, *Cynicus* 15: 'I wish the entire earth to be a sufficient bed for me, and the universe my home...' The heroic model underlying the *Cynicus* is still the wandering Heracles (cf. 13).

senting himself as an outcast wanderer, the Cynic advertises his contempt for social conventions and his practice of hardship. Cynic wandering, no matter how solitary, has an audience. It is not by chance that it fell to the Cynics, the least intellectual and the most exhibitionist philosophers, to make wandering a part of their programme. For no Greek philosopher in the classical period is reported as wandering while he is seeking mental concentration and withdrawal. The withdrawn thinker stands, like Socrates in the *Symposium*; sits, like Heracles in Prodicus' allegory; or walks in order, up and down, like Plato as caricatured by the comic poet Alexis. He does not wander. In the background of such widespread resistance to associating the behaviour of the concentrated philosopher with that of the solitary wanderer is the tendency, equally widespread in Greek thought, to perceive the wanderer as a deceiver or a mad person. These connotations of wandering may explain why the figure of the wanderer could hardly appeal to the philosopher who seeks the 'unerring' truth and aims for self-possession (that is, for an 'unwandering' mind), except if the latter state is achieved, as in the case of the Cynics, not through a curriculum of study, but through an exercise of detachment and open rejection of traditional values and cultural conventions.

SILVIA MONTIGLIO

University of Wisconsin at Madison

REFERENCES

- Anderson, G. (1994) *Sage, Saint and Sophist. Holy Men and their Associates in the Early Roman Empire* (London and New York)
- Asheri, D. (ed.) (1991) *Erodoto, Le storie I* (2nd ed., Milan)
- Baldry, H.C. (1965) *The Unity of Mankind in Greek Thought* (Cambridge)
- Barrett, W.S. (ed.) (1964) *Euripides Hippolytos* (Oxford)
- Billerbeck, M. (1993) 'Le Cynisme idéalisé d'Épictète à Julien', in Goulet-Cazé and Goulet (eds.) 319–38
- Billot, M.-F. (1993) 'Antisthène et le Cynosarges dans l'Athènes des Ve et IVe siècles', in Goulet-Cazé and Goulet (eds.) 69–116
- Bluck, R.S. (1975) *Plato's Sophist* (Manchester)
- Bowersock, G.W. (1969) *Greek Sophists in the Roman Empire* (Oxford)
- Branham, R.B. (1993) 'Diogenes' rhetoric and the invention of Cynicism', in Goulet-Cazé and Goulet (eds.) 445–73
- and M.-O. Goulet-Cazé (eds.) (1996) *The Cynics. The Cynic Movement in Antiquity and its Legacy* (Berkeley and Los Angeles)
- Bremmer, J. (1991) 'Walking, standing, and sitting in ancient Greek culture', in J. Bremmer and H. Roodenburg (eds.), *A Cultural History of Gesture* (Ithaca) 13–35
- Burkert, W. (1983) *Homo Necans: The Anthropology of Ancient Greek Sacrificial Ritual and Myth*, trans. by Peter Bing (Berkeley)
- Casson, L. (1994) *Travel in the Ancient World* (2nd ed., Baltimore and London)
- Cornford, F.M. (1960) 'Empedocles', in *The Cambridge Ancient History* (Cambridge) 4.563–9
- Coxon, A.H. (ed.) (1986) *The Fragments of Parmenides* (Assen and Maastricht)
- Cremonini, G. (ed.) (1991) *Anacharsi Scita, Lettere* (Palermo)
- Dorandi, T. (1993) 'La Politeia de Diogène de Sinope et quelques remarques sur sa pensée politique', in Goulet-Cazé and Goulet (eds.) 57–68
- Dover, K. (ed.) (1995) *Plato Symposium* (2nd ed., Cambridge)
- Downing, F.G. (1993) 'Cynics and Early Christianity', in Goulet-Cazé and Goulet (eds.) 281–304
- Dudley, D. (1937) *A History of Cynicism. From Diogenes to the 6th Century A.D.* (London)
- Gallavotti, C. (ed.) (1975) *Empedocle. Poema fisico e lustrale* (Milan)
- Gallop, D. (ed.) (1984) *Parmenides of Elea, Fragments* (Toronto, Buffalo and London)
- Giannantoni, G. (1993) 'Antistene fondatore della scuola cinica?', in Goulet-Cazé and Goulet (eds.) 15–34
- Goulet-Cazé, M.-O. (1986) *L'ascèse cynique* (Paris)
- Goulet-Cazé, M.-O. and R. Goulet (eds.) (1993) *Le Cynisme ancien et ses prolongements* (Paris)

- Griffin, M.T. (1993) 'Le mouvement cynique et les Romains: attraction et répulsion', in Goulet-Cazé and Goulet (eds.) 241–58
- Hartog, F. (1980) *Le miroir d'Hérodote* (Paris)
- Höistad, R. (1948) *Cynic Hero and Cynic King. Studies in the Cynic Conception of Man* (Uppsala)
- Kerferd, G.B. (1981) *The Sophistic Movement* (Cambridge)
- Khazanov, A.-M. (1982) 'Les Scythes et la civilisation antique: problèmes des contacts', *Dialogues d'histoire ancienne* 8, 7–51
- Kindstrand, J.F. (1981) *Anacharsis. The Legend and the Apophthegmata* (Uppsala)
- Ladner, G.B. (1967) 'Homo Viator: mediaeval ideas on alienation and order', *Speculum* 42, 233–59
- Lana, I. (1951) 'Tracce di dottrine cosmopolitiche in Grecia prima del Cinismo', *Rivista di Filologia e di Istruzione Classica* n.s. 29, 193–216 and 317–38
- Long, A.A. (1993) 'The Socratic tradition: Diogenes, Crates, and Hellenistic ethics', in Branham and Goulet-Cazé (eds.) 28–46
- Loroux, N. (1995) *The Experiences of Tiresias: The Feminine and the Greek Man*, trans. by Paula Wissing (Princeton)
- Lovejoy, A.O. and G. Boas (1980) *Primitivism and Related Ideas in Antiquity* (2nd ed., New York)
- Marincola, J. (1997) 'Odysseus and the historians', *Histos* 1 (<http://www.dur.ac.uk/Classics/histos/1997>)
- Martin, A. and O. Primavesi (eds.) (1999) *L'Empédocle de Strasbourg (P. Strasb. gr. Inv. 1665–1666). Introduction, édition et commentaire* (Berlin and New York)
- Martin, R. (1996) 'The Scythian accent: Anacharsis and the Cynics', in Branham and Goulet-Cazé (eds.) 136–55
- Matton, S. (1996) 'Cynicism and Christianity from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance', in Branham and Goulet-Cazé (eds.) 240–64
- Moles, J. (1993) 'Le cosmopolitisme cynique', in Goulet-Cazé and Goulet (eds.) 259–80
- Movia, G. (1994) *Apparenze, essere e verità. Commentario storico-filosofico al 'Sofista' di Platone* (2nd ed., Milan)
- Navia, L. (1996) *Classical Cynicism. A Critical Study* (Westport, Conn. and London)
- O'Brien, D. (1969) *Empedocles' Cosmic Cycle* (Cambridge)
- Onfray, D. (1990) *Cynismes. Portrait du philosophe en chien* (Paris)
- Padel, R. (1995) *Whom Gods Destroy* (Princeton)
- Paquet, R. (1975) *Les Cyniques grecs. Fragments et témoignages* (Ottawa)
- Payen, P. (1997) *Les îles nomades. Conquérir et résister dans l'Enquête d'Hérodote* (Paris)
- Pratt, L. (1993) *Lying and Poetry from Homer to Pindar: Falsehood and Deception in Archaic Greek Poetics* (Ann Arbor)
- Rankin, H.D. (1983) *Sophists, Socratics and Cynics* (London and Canberra)
- Redfield, J. (1985) 'Herodotus the tourist', *Classical Philology* 80, 97–118
- Rosen, S. (1983) *Plato's Sophist. The Drama of Original and Image* (New Haven and London)
- Rousseau, J.-J. (1959) *Oeuvres complètes* (Paris)
- Sayre, F. (1938) *Diogenes of Sinope. A Study of Greek Cynicism* (Baltimore)
- (1948) *The Greek Cynics* (Baltimore)
- Segal, C. (1994) *Singers, Heroes, and Gods in the Odyssey* (Ithaca and London)
- Stanford, W.B. (1968) *The Ulysses Theme. A Study in the Adaptability of a Traditional Hero* (Ann Arbor)
- Ungefehr-Kortus, C. (1996) *Anacharsis, der Typus des edlen, weisen Barbaren* (Frankfurt)
- Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, U. von (1969) *Euripides Herakles* (Darmstadt)
- Wright, M.R. (ed.) (1995) *Empedocles. The Extant Fragments* (2nd ed., London and Indianapolis)
- Zafiropulo, M.R. (1953) *Empédocle d'Agrigente* (Paris)